Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children (...) learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed John 0. Nelson It is obviously important for Hume's purposes in the Treatise to maintain that simple ideas are always founded in precedent, resembling impressions;1 andhe explicitly, overandover, doesso, evensometimes being so carried away by this first principle ofhis science of man (T 7) or so careless as to say that not just all simple ideas but all ideas are founded in (...) precedent, resembling impressions. At the same time, as often noted, Hume explicitly maintains that it is possible for there to be a simple idea having no precedent, corresponding impression. He argues: There is however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions... Suppose... a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue... Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, beplac'd before him... Now Iask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himselfthe idea ofthat particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there arefew but will be ofopinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions. (T 5) Nowjust prior to this concession (as Cummins calls it ), Hume has said that the full examination ofthis question [the causal relationship between ideas and impression] is the subject of the present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. (T 4) Volume XV Number 2 353 JOHN O. NELSON And just after the same concession, that a simple idea may be raised up which does not have a prior, correspondent impression, Hume says that it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions (T 7). Thus we have Hume explicitly asserting, it seems, both that all simple ideas have precedent correspondent impressions and that they do not. But this, on the face ofit, is an arrant contradiction! Can Hume have Homerically nodded? We have been quoting from the Treatise, but Hume makes the very same contradictory-seeming claims in the Enquiryl A thinker of Hume's acumen might nod for a page or two's quarter hour but not for all of nine years! Moreover, in both places Hume refers to the phenomenon of the impression-less idea ofblue as a contradictory phenomenon, indicating clearly enough that he was himself aware of there seeming to be an inconsistency here in his contentions. What can possibly be going on? Is Hume deliberately being paradoxical? Perhaps trying, for sensation's sake, to shock the reader and so increase sales of his work, as some commentators in the past might have wished to say? But this would be at the expense ofhis own contentions and principles and not the reader's, and not even Hume's bitterest foes and most malicious critics — so far as I know — have ever proposed that Hume would, figuratively speaking, like Oedipus, gouge out his own eyes, even in order to increase sales of the Treatise, nor does it make the slightest sense to think he would. The mystery deepens when we remember that Hume has said, in defining the program of the Treatise, that his intention is to establish the one general proposition that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondentto them (T4). What astrange way, we want to exclaim, to show that all our simple ideas are derived from correspondent simple impressions by almost immediately afterwards arguing that it is possible to have an idea that has had no correspondent, precedent impression! Such an egregious nonsequitur mightbe expected ofan absolutely incompetent beginner in philosophy, but we are speaking of David Hume, generally recognized as the profoundest and most acute of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:347 THE ROLE OF PART XII IN HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION Anyone appreciative of Hume's greatness as a philosopher will want to suppose that the Dialogues both form a coherent whole and express Hume's own views on natural religion or religion based on reason (as opposed to religion based on revelation). In the last connection, given what we know of Hume's epistemology, life, and correspondence, one would be (...) inclined to suppose that he would reject out of hand the claims of revealed religion and contend that if there existed an acceptable religion it would have to be some form of natural religion. But insofar as natural religion claimed to establish scientifically the existence and nature of God one would envisage Hume dissenting. Now as long as we restrict our gaze to Parts I-XI of the Dialogues we seem to be able, easily enough, to satisfy all these suppositions. In Part IV, under the name of 'mysticism, ' revealed religion is summarily and facetiously dismissed as 2 indistinguishable from atheism. Demea's apparently permanent departure from the discussion at the conclusion of Part XI as much as says, symbolically, that revealed religion is not a serious contender for one's belief. Its a priori arguments -- the argument from sufficient reason and the ontological argument -- are almost as shortly attacked and dismissed (D 188-192). Also quite in keeping with Hume's philosophical view on knowledge of matters of fact is, on the other hand, the lengthy and detailed examination he bestows on the empiricist argument from design. That Philo, ostensibly his spokesman, is however able to uncover all kinds of logical short-comings in its claims to scientifically 348 establish the existence and nature of God does not surprise us; it coheres perfectly with our preconceived picture of Hume the skeptic, and his system as restricting science to numbers and quantities or, in the term's looser sense, to human nature and its more immediate surroundings. In short, Parts I-XI seem to be all of one Humean whole. But at first and even second glance Part XII notoriously seems to tear our hopes to find coherence and a plausible representation of Hume to tatters. There are, for one thing, those mocking sentences that seem to paint Hume in the colors of a devout, believing Christian, 'avid' for revelation. Thus, at the end of Part XII, apparently expressing Hume's deepest convictions, Philo says that "a person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity" and immediately afterwards, "To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian" (D 227, 228). For another thing, in Part XII Hume seems to be completely reversing his refutations in Parts I-XI of the argument from design's claims to establish the existence and nature of God. Thus, where in Part II he had Philo reject the use of causal reasoning in the establishment of a Mind as the first cause of the universe on the relevantly Humean grounds that, to do so, "it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds" (D 150), in Part XII he has Philo, apparently speaking for himself (Hume), argue that "as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause than any we have ever observed in mankind. 349 Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly ascertained by reason" (D 217). Indeed, all forms of the argument of design, purely analogical as well as causal, seem resurrected in Part XII, although they were one and all hanged and buried in Parts I-XI. Moreover, it seems that in Part XII Hume via Philo is saying that science itself leads us "to acknowledge a first intelligent Author" (D 214-215). Before proceeding to deal with certain other incoherencies with which Part XII seems to confront us let us address ourselves to the two that I have so far... (shrink)

A r anderson and n d belnap, Jr., Maintained in their 1962 article, "the pure calculus of entailment," that necessary propositions can be entailed only by necessary propositions, And not by contingent ones. Against this r w ashby offered an apparently conclusive counterexample in "entailment and modality" (1963). In support of anderson and belnap, The author of the present paper develops a definition of entailment and argues that contingent propositions never entail necessary ones. However, Psychological factors may intervene in our (...) logical perceptions to produce an appearance or illusion of entailment between a contingent and a necessary proposition. (staff). (shrink)

Introduction: conceptual analysis of teaching, by B. P. Komisar and T. W. Nelson.--A concept of teaching, by B. O. Smith.--The concept of teaching, by I. Sheffler.--A topology of the teaching concept, by T. F. Green.--Teaching: act and enterprise, by B. P. Komisar.--Must an education have an aim? By R. S. Peters.--Curriculum as a field of study, by D. Heubner.--Can and should means-ends reasoning be used in teaching? By C. J. B. Macmillan and J. E. McClellan.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:372 BOOK REVIEWS This understanding, moreover, gives ontological validity to the communication of idioms, which Morris surprisingly sees as accomplishing nothing but" muddying the water" (p. 49). As God, the Son is omniscient, immutable, all-powerful, etc., but in his new mode of existence as man, he is truly ignorant, passible, and limited. Existing as man, the Son experiences all that pertains to historioolly conditioned humanity. In the Incarnation the (...) "·who", the person, remains the same, but the manner of the experience of the " Who " is distinctly different-divine and human-without confusion, change, division, or separation. The mystery obviously remains, but it is meaningful and coherent. (For a more complete presentation of these arguments see the author's : Does God Change? : The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation, Still River: St. Bede's, 1985). As stated at the outset, Morris presents a thorough and provocative study which should be read and studied by scholars. While he aptly critiques his opponents, he fails to challenge their understanding of the incarnational notion of "become" and the ensuing union. Rather, he himself presupposes that the Incarnation implies a compositional union of natures which in turn leads to an unresolvable incompatibility between the divine and human attributes in Christ. Morris may have been aided had he been more acquainted with the early Christological controversies and councils. Nevertheless, Morris has clearly raised many important contemporary Christological issues and has admirably attempted to provide answers which are faithful both to the Christian tradition and to human i~ea..'\On and logic. Mother of God Community, Washington, D.O. THOMAS WEINaNDY O.F.M., Cap. Community: A Trinity of Models. By FRANK G. KmKPATRICK. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1986. Pp. 248. Cloth $17.95; paper $10.95. In recent years the pathology of atomistic individualism has been variously described by the Council Fathers of Vahlcan II, liberationist and feminist theologians, Stanley Hauer.was, and countless other theological and secular critics. According to Frank Kirkpatrick, therapeutic intervention will not be effective in the long run unless it is based upon an alternative conceptual "model" of human oommunity. Of course, Kirkpa.tric.k has something specific in mind. Not just any alternative will do. Marxian models of human association, for example, are prone to BOOK REVIEWS 373 totalitarianism and the denial of proper individuality. Thus, he offers what he calls "the mutual/personal model of community" as "a substantial grounding for a Christian vision of community congruent with liberationist and feminist concerns " (vii). Western culture has generated a welter of perspectives on the nature and ground of human association. Within this motley, Kirkpatrick discerns three models of oommunity which have shaped Western social philosophy and religious thought. The book de~crihes these traditional models by identifying their controlling metaphors, accounts of human nature and its fulfillment, and the social, economic, and political practices and institutions they undergird. The author appraises the strengths and weaknesses of the models and attempts to reconcile their positive features within the Christian vision of Koinonia. The first model is "the atomistic/contractarian" wherein persons are regarded as "independent atoms rationally contracting with each other for the terms of their enforced relationship" (2). Kirkpatrick locates its sources in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, James Mill, Adam Smith, and Rousseau. Observing that the individualism of this tradition has always flourished in America, Kirkpatrick surveys some of its c001temporary expressions in the work of George Gilder, F. A. Hayek, Michael N·ovak, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls. The fruits of the atomistic/ contracta.rian model are, to Kirkpatrick's taste, mostly bad-isolation, alienation, oppression, injustice-and are ineongruent with Christian Koinonia. His second model, " the organic/functional," views persons as "organs, interdependent and functionally related to each other within a larger organism" (2). Conceived by Edmund Burke, this model became fully formed and viable in the thought of Hegel and Marx, and was instrumental in the analyses of sociologists such as Ferdinand Tonnies and Charles H. Cooley. Kirkpatrick is troubled by this model's tendency to view human relationships exhaustively in terms of co-operativ.e function. He worries that there is an insufficient" sense of individual difference and self-identity to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Authorship oftheAbstract: AReply to John O. Nelson JeffBroome In "The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited," John O. Nelson argues for the once widely held view that Adam Smith was the author of the Abstract.1 Generally speaking, however, this view has not been seriously maintained since the 1938 reprinting of the Abstract by Keynes and Sraffa. There, in their introduction, Keynes and Sraffa argue that Adam (...) Smith was not the author ofthe Abstract, but rather Hume was.2 The central document from which the traditional view derived its authority comes in an early letter of Hume to Hutcheson (hereafter noted as Hl). It is worth quoting the passage in full. Writes Hume to Hutcheson, My Bookseller has sent to Mr. Smith a copy ofmy book, which I hope he has receiv'd, as well as your letter. I have not yet heard what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 The once widely held view argues that Adam Smith is the Mr. Smith referred toin this passage, and therefore thatAdam Smith is the author of the Abstract. The argument proceeds: Smith at the time of Hl was a pupil of Hutcheson, and it was a habit of Hutcheson to have his promising students write abstracts of standard and contemporary works. It is then assumed that Adam Smith had written the Abstract, that Hutcheson was so impressed with it that he sent a copy to Hume, and that Hume in turn was so impressed that he arranged for its immediate publication, and, as seemingly mentioned in Hl, rewarded Smith with a presentation copy ofthe first two volumes ofhis Treatise. The Keynes and Sraffa thesis argues that the Mr. Smith in Hl cannot be Adam Smith, but rather must be John Smith of Dublin, "at the Philosopher's Head on the Blind Quay" (Abstract, xxiii). Their argument hinges on the conjecture that Hume was interested in an Irish editionofthe Treatise, andtherefore, Hume isaskingHutcheson's assistance in securing John Smith's help in this endeavour (Abstract, Volume XVII Number 2 95 JEFFBROOME xxii). The removal of Adam Smith as the Mr. Smith referred to in Hl consequently seems to explode theAdam Smith authorshiphypothesis. John Nelson first argued fifteen years ago against the Keynes/Sraffa thesis,4 challenging as unlikely the claim that the Mr. Smith in Hl must be John Smith ofDublin, and in the April 1991 issue of Hume Studies he reasserts his position more forcefully, arguing instead that it is impossible that "Mr. Smith" could be John Smith. Since the Mr. Smith of Hl is not John Smith, Nelson goes on to ask "who could he be except the Adam Smith ofthe traditional theory?"5 A closer examination ofeach view, Nelson's and Keynes/Sraffa's, reveals an assumption concerning an Irish publication of the Treatise that precludes any fully coherent resolution of the issue. I shall argue that the proper conclusion tobe drawn from Hl should be that the Mr. Smith is the Dublin publisher John Smith. On this point Keynes and Sraffa are correct; but against their thesis, I shall argue that Hume's purpose in referring toJohn Smith is not to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Treatise (volumes 1 and 2, and the soon to be published volume 3), but rather to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Abstract, in the hope that this would help to promote sales of the already publishedvolumes 1 and 2 ofthe Treatise. Thus, Hl should not be taken to decide the authorship ofthe Abstract, as Keynes and Sraffa, as well as John Nelson, argue. If anything, deciding the authorship of the Abstract should be made from Hume's personal copy of the Abstract, annotated in Hume's own hand, which is preserved in the British Museum. We notice in Hl that Hume asks two favours. The first is meant to draw upon Hutcheson's experience in publishing. Hume merely wants to know what... (shrink)

This well organized and interesting anthology concerns the image of the self-directed individual as replaced by a deterministic model of his behavior. Since legal, personal-social, and religious institutions still see man as self-controlled and therefore responsible, Mr. Klausner views this replacement as particularly troublesome. The first third of the book is predominantly historical and draws from an extremely tolerant range of sources including yoga, philosophy, psychology, hypnosis and self-help publications. The remainder of the volume is psychological and sociological, with emphasis (...) on the individual acting under stress, and with the traditional philosophical problems completely ignored. While the thematic problem is not obviously tackled there is fruitful examination of significant concepts with detailed and well-researched relationships of these concepts with a manifold of phenomena. There are several extensive bibliographies accompanying the readings. Not including introductory contributions the book includes: "Self-Control in the Perspective of History": Klausner, B. Nelson, Moses Hadas; "Self-Control in a Sociological Perspective": S. M. Dornbusch, M. K. Opler, Guy E. Swanson; "Self-Control in Psychological Perspective": I. L. Janis, S. J. Korchin, H. Liddel; "Self-Control in Psychiatric Perspective": M. T. Orne, O. McK, Rioch, K. Goldstein; and "Scientific Hermeneutics": Klausner.—D. A. G. (shrink)

D. O. Thomas; XIII—Obedience to Conscience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 243–258, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

sirIn the January 4 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine three articles appeared on the unapproved use of Misoprostol , which raise an interesting ethical question. The synthetic prostaglandin analogue, Misoprostol, has been successfully used by obstetricians and gynaecologists for a number of years for the induction of a medical abortion in the first or second trimester, for the induction of labour, and for the prevention of postpartum haemorrhages.1 Strangely enough the pharmaceutical company which produces and markets the (...) drug, Searle, …. (shrink)

A case is described of a man who discovered years after donating sperm for artificial insemination, that he had a serious genetic disease, autosomal dominant cerebellar ataxia . This manifests itself only years after puberty and occurs in 50% of the progeny. The sperm had been used for the conception of 18 children in 13 women. The parents were only told three years after the insemination. This long time interval was unavoidable since many of the parents had to be found (...) and the hospital director wished first to discuss the matter with his legal advisors and other experts.In future, in agreement with the new law only 10 inseminations will take place with sperm from one donor. This will reduce still further the availability of donor sperm. (shrink)

The following essay is an attempt at bringing together two conceptions, the one theological and ascetical, the other philos–ophical. This confrontation may be attempted either from the point of view of theology, using revealed premises, or from the point of view of philosophy using the methods of purely rational analysis. It is the latter task I am undertaking here. I do not argue from revealed premises, but I do take account of the mighty phenomenon of the Christian revelation. It is, (...) as I see it, absolutely essential to keep theology and philosophy distinct as methods, but this does not prevent the one from providing useful material and suggestive hypotheses for the other. (shrink)

On Dharma as depicted in Mahābhārata, Hindu classical epic.

In September 1998 the Dutch Ministry of Health together with the Dutch Society of General Practitioners , the Royal Dutch Society of Pharmacists , and the Dutch Patient and Consumer Federation published a pamphlet entitled: The same medicine in a different coat. Drugs without a trademark, equally effective, but cheaper. Patients could obtain a copy at the local pharmacy or in the waiting room of their general practitioner. It deals with the question whether the name of the patent drug should (...) be written on the prescription or only the active component. This is important because, according to the authors, the costs of health care can be reduced without reducing the quality of the care if the doctor prescribes the generic form. It is also mentioned that another advantage of prescribing the generic form is that, contrary to the …. (shrink)

D.O. Thomas; VI*—The Duty to Trust, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 89–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

Last year I described in this journal1 an unacceptable influence of a pharmaceutical company on the off-label use of one of its products. Now I would like to report on an acceptable and even praiseworthy initiative of a pharmaceutical manufacturer in monitoring the use of its drug. The devastating action of thalidomide on the human embryo caused its withdrawal from the market in ….

Apocalyptic expectations of Armageddon and a New Age have been a fixture of the American cultural landscape for centuries. With the approach of the year 2000, such millennial visions seem once again to be increasing in popularity. Stephen O'Leary sheds new light on the age-old phenomenon of the End of the Age by proposing a rhetorical explanation for the appeal of millennialism. Using examples of apocalyptic argument from ancient to modern times, O'Leary identifies the recurring patterns in apocalyptic texts and (...) movements and shows how and why the Christian Apocalypse has been used to support a variety of political stances and programs. The book concludes with a critical review of the recent appearances of doomsday scenarios in our politics and culture, and a meditation on the significance of the Apocalypse in the nuclear age. Arguing the Apocalypse is the most thorough examination of its subject to date: a study of a neglected chapter of our religious and cultural history, a guide to the politics of Armageddon, and a map of millennial consciousness. (shrink)

Although there are exceptions, the principle of primum nil nocere remains the cornerstone of the practice of medicine. In the well known handbook, Goodman and Gilman’s The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics1 a case is presented which raises doubts about the permissibility of off-label administration of certain drugs to healthy troops as a preventive measure. The following citation from this handbook gives a clear description of the problem:"Prophylaxis in cholinesterase inhibitor poisoning. Studies in experimental animals have shown that pretreatment with pyridostigmine (...) reduces the incapacitation and mortality associated with “nerve agent” poisoning, particularly for agents, such as soman, that … ". (shrink)